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INTRODUCTION 
  The paper explores how developing Asia can utilize the potential of information and 
communications technology (ICT) to foster economic growth and welfare. We ask what needs to be done 
to move from a plethora of “digital divides” that cut off a majority of Asian populations from potential 
benefits, to a long-term development strategy of upgrading the region`s economic structures and 
institutions. 
Developing Asia`s success on the production side is common knowledge: the electronics industry 
is the most prominent example of rapid catching-up and the latest example of export-led growth.   
Especially for the standard bearers of the “East Asian Miracle” (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines), as well as China/Hong Kong, electronic equipment and components 
dominate industrial manufacturing and exports. A central proposition of this paper is that a focus on 
export-led production of electronics goods can no longer guarantee sustained growth and welfare 
improvements. It only captures a small fraction of the potential benefits from ICT. Export-led production 
also faces serious external limitations from volatile global finance, currency and export markets. Three 
fundamental weaknesses characterize the region`s electronics industries: a sticky specialization on 
exportable “commodities”, a narrow domestic knowledge base, and limited forward and backward 
linkages. 
It is time to match a focus on production with the development of effective demand for ICT 
investment within the region. This is necessary to reduce multiple and persistent digital divides. These 
divides separate developing Asia from industrialized countries, and the poor countries in the region from 
the more developed ones. They also exclude rural areas, and lower income groups from access to 
information. These divides indicate a huge, underutilized potential to establish ICT as an engine of 
economic growth and welfare. 
Enhancing the diffusion of ICT however does not imply a neglect of ICT production. Both hang 
together and need each other. A defining characteristic of developing Asia is a fundamental mismatch 
between the production and the limited and unequal diffusion of ICT. To reduce this mismatch, it is 
  1 necessary to increase the use of ICT as a tool to boost productivity, speed and flexibility of the region´s 
production systems and economic institutions. Equally important is the potential of ICT to enhance 
learning efficiency and innovation, and to improve the transparency of governance structures. Threats to 
the region´s competitiveness provide a powerful rationale for such a shift in strategy. Industrial upgrading 
must complement the current emphasis on financial and corporate restructuring. It constitutes the 
medium-term challenge that Developing Asia must master in order to unleash new ICT-enabled sources 
of growth. Defined as a shift to higher value-added products and production stages through increasing 
specialization and forward and backward linkages, industrial upgrading necessitates a strong domestic 
knowledge base. 
  In section 1, we introduce a conceptual framework for analyzing the impact of ICT on economic 
development. Two inter-related concepts serve as a focusing device for the subsequent analysis and 
discussion: a focus on organizational innovation; and the concept of “industrial upgrading” (IU). In 
sections 2 and 3, we review achievements and limitations of export-led electronics production, and the 
resultant mismatch between the production and use of ICT. In section 4, we document the region´s 
multiple “digital divides”, emphasizing the importance of intra-regional divides, and illustrate their 
constraining impact on IU. In the final section 5, we present suggestions for policy design and 
implementation and spell out priorities for future research. In a region as diverse as developing Asia, no 
“one-size-fits-all” approach will work. We first highlight the diversity of economic agents involved in the 
region´s production and use of ICT. Based on a taxonomy of “ICT for Development” strategies, we then 
assess alternative sequencing patterns of moving from partial to integrated strategies. We highlight 
unfulfilled promises of the “New Economy” model and the need to move from poverty alleviation to ICT -
enabled industrial upgrading. We conclude with recommendations for funding priorities for international 
development agencies.  
1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1. A Focus on Organizational Innovation 
a) Impacts of ICT 
Following Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), we argue that the impact of ICT on economic 
performance is mediated by a combination of intangible inputs and outputs that act as powerful catalysts 
  2 for organizational innovation. “Intangible inputs” include, for instance, the development of new software 
and databases; the adjustment of existing business processes; the recruitment of specialized human 
resources and their continuous upgrading; and, induced by all of this, the transformation of existing 
economic structures, institutions and business strategies. Of equal importance are “intangible outputs” 
that would not exist without ICT, like new modes of communication and knowledge exchange, speed of 
delivery, flexibility of response to abrupt changes in demand and technologies, reduced energy and 
resource intensity of production, cost effective quality improvements, modular and manufacturing-friendly 
product design, and the spread of knowledge-intensive support services. 
After a while, these induced organizational changes may lead to productivity growth, by reducing 
the cost of coordination, communications and information processing. Most importantly, these 
organizational changes enable economic agents “to increase output quality in the form of new products or 
in improvements in intangible aspects of existing products like convenience, timeliness, quality and 
variety.” (Brynjolfson and Hitt, 2000, p.4). In short, we are talking about a complex process that involves a 
set of inter-related (“systemic”) changes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990): by combining ICT with changes in 
work practices, strategies, and products and services, a firm transforms its organization as well as its 
relations with suppliers, partners and customers.  
Once we adapt such a framework, it becomes clear that benefits from an ICT-enabled 
transformation of business or public organizations can be enormous. A long-term process of “digital 
convergence” has enabled the same infrastructure to accommodate manipulation and transmission of 
voice, video, and data (Chandler and Cortada, 2000). The use of ICT as a management tool has 
experienced two important transformations (Nolan, 2000). From a machine to automate transaction 
processing, the focus has shifted to the extraction of value from information resources, and then further to 
the establishment of Internet-enabled flexible information infrastructures that can support the extraction 
and exchange of knowledge across firm boundaries and national borders. Compared to earlier 
generations of ICT, the Internet appears to provide much greater opportunities to share knowledge with a 
much greater number of people faster, more accurately, and in greater detail, even if they are not 
permanently co-located (Ernst, 2001a, 2001d). While such forms of interactive learning across borders 
are still exceptional, they illustrate nevertheless a huge potential for reorganizing the global chain of 
  3 knowledge creation. Once these developments gather momentum, they will have dramatic implications 
for developing Asia´s long-term development. But when this happens, it may be too late to start research 
that could guide policy responses. 
b) Drivers 
These transformations in the use of ICT are driven by a combination of powerful technological 
and economic forces that have created an unequal distribution of benefits (Ernst, 2001b, 2001c). On the 
technology side, the move towards “open standards” in ICT architecture (UNIX, Linux, and HTML) and 
protocols (TCP/IP) enabled large global corporations (the “network flagships”) to integrate their existing 
intranets and extranets
1 on the Internet. By reducing cost and by multiplying connectivity, the Internet 
dramatically extends the flagships` reach across firm boundaries and national borders
2. By transmitting 
information in digital format instantly, and at much lower cost than earlier technology generations (like 
electronic data interchange, EDI), the Internet substantially broadens the scope for collaboration across 
organizational and national boundaries. A new generation of networking software provides flexible 
infrastructures that, computer scientists claim, “support not only information exchange, but also 
knowledge sharing, creation and utilization.” (Jørgensen and Krogstie, 2000). The key is the open-ended 
structure of the Internet, which allows extra networks to be added at any point, creating almost unlimited 
opportunities for outsourcing and the diffusion of knowledge. 
  On the economic side, far-reaching changes in work organization have fundamentally increased 
the requirements for information management and for the exchange of knowledge (e.g., Ciborra et al, 
2000). The transition from Fordist “mass production” to “mass customization” requires a capacity to 
constantly adapt products or services to changing customer requirements, “sensing and responding” to 
individual customer needs in real time (Bradley and Nolan, 1998)
3. This necessitates dynamic, interactive 
information systems, and a capacity to rapidly adjust organizations to disruptive changes in markets and 
technology. Second, real-time resource allocation, performance monitoring and accounting became 
                                                            
1 An “intranet” is defined as a private network contained within an organization (a firm) that consists of many inter-
linked LANs (= local-area networks). Its main purpose is to share company information and computer resources 
among employees. An “extranet” in turn is a private network that links the flagship via conventional 
telecommunications networks with preferred suppliers, customers and strategic partners.  
2 These issues are addressed in an international policy-oriented research project, coordinated by the East-West 
Center (Honolulu, Hawaii) on “Global Corporate Networks, Digital Information Systems and the Mobility of 
Knowledge: Asian Experiences”. 
  4 necessary, due to the short-term pressures of the financial system (quarterly reports) and due to the 
shortening life cycles of products and technologies.  
Finally, globalization has acted as a third important driver of increasingly complex information 
requirements. The key is a fundamental transformation of production that affects manufacturing, finance 
and professional services. A transition is under way from “multinational corporations”, with their focus on 
stand-alone overseas investment projects, to “global network flagships” that integrate their geographically 
dispersed supply, knowledge and customer bases into global (and regional) production and knowledge 
networks (Ernst, 2001ed; Ernst, forthcoming). These networks help the global flagships to sustain their 
competitiveness, by providing them with access to specialized suppliers at lower-cost locations who excel 
in quick and flexible response to the flagships’ requirements. The coordination of these networks requires  
ICT-based flexible and adaptive information systems. 
All of this is should remind us that the distribution of benefits from ICT is bound to be unequal. It 
would be misleading to deny that global corporations (the network flagships) are the primary 
beneficiaries. This raises the question, under what conditions economic agents in developing Asia can 
position themselves to reap a reasonable share of these benefits. To answer that question, we need to 
introduce an operational concept of economic development
4. 
1.2.Industrial Upgrading  
An appropriate long-term development strategy must focus on improvements in specialization, 
productivity, and linkages (as defined by Hirschman, 1958, chapter 6), all of which necessitate local 
knowledge creation. All four elements are essential prerequisites for improving a country's capacity to 
raise long-term capital that is necessary for facility investment, R&D, human resource development and 
welfare expenditures. The concept of industrial upgrading (IU) ties these four elements together in a 
cohesive framework to serve as a focusing device for unlocking the economic growth potential of ICT
5.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 For good reason, this has given rise to concern about invasion of data privacy. 
4 As Heeks (1999: p. ) correctly highlights, most research on ICT and economic development neglects this critical 
issue.  
5  By focusing on knowledge and innovation as major sources of economic growth, our approach is consistent with 
leading-edge economic thinking, such as endogenous growth theories (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 
1991); Lipsey`s structuralist growth theory (e.g., Lipsey, 2001); evolutionary economics (e.g., Penrose, 1959/1995; 
Richardson, 1960/1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982); and attempts to reunite economic growth and innovation theory 
and business history (e.g., Lazonick, 2000). A focus on knowledge and innovation also reflects a recent shift in 
  5 The stylized framework of industrial upgrading used here is designed to explain how specialization affects 
market structure and upgrading potential.  The framework also highlights the conditions that make it 
possible to move from partial to integrated strategies of “ICT for Development” ( see section 5). 
It is important to emphasize that “industrial upgrading” differs fundamentally from “import 
substitution” that has frustrated much of Latin America´s earlier development efforts (Ernst, 1973). In 
response to the external bottleneck problems created by Latin America´s traditional “export enclave” 
economies ( Prebisch, 1962), import substitution was conceived as an “anti-trade bias strategy” (Balassa, 
1970) that neglected the potential benefits of international trade and investment in manufactured 
products. Once the easy phase of import substitution was reached, that strategy stifled productivity and 
long-term economic growth (Bruton, 1967 and 1968). 
We do not assume that IU ends at the national border, and that it occurs only if improved 
specialization generates pressures to create dense forward and backward linkages within the district or 
the national economy. A “closed economy” assumption is unrealistic, as globalization and ICT have 
drastically increased the international mobility of trade, investment, and even knowledge (Ernst, 
2001d).This increases the scope for cross-border forward and backward linkages, in a similar manner 
that improved specialization generates pressures to create dense forward and backward linkages within 
the economy (Ernst, 2001f). Equally important, most countries are constrained by a narrow domestic 
knowledge base and limited linkages. 
Both constraints are particularly important for developing economies. One of their primary 
features is a narrow and incomplete set of domestic linkages (e.g, Lall, 1997; Ernst, Ganiatsos, and 
Mytelka, 1998). The result is an “inverted production pyramid”: a growing final product sector rests on a 
weak and much smaller domestic base of support industries (Ernst, 2001g). Rapid growth in the final 
products sector necessitates considerable imports of intermediates and production equipment (see 
section 3). In addition, highly heterogeneous economic structures constrain agglomeration economies; 
weak and unstable economic institutions obstruct learning efficiency; and a high vulnerability to volatile 
global currency and financial markets constrain patient capital that is necessary for the development of a 
broad domestic knowledge base. As a result of this “vicious circle”, very limited sharing and pooling of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
policy debates within important international institutions, such as the OECD, the World Bank, and the European 
  6 resources and knowledge occurs within the country, and often even within the export-oriented cluster. 
This implies that our model of IU needs to integrate international knowledge linkages. To compensate for 
their narrow domestic knowledge base and limited linkages, Asian developing economies have to rely on 
foreign sources of knowledge to catalyze domestic capability formation. International linkages need to 
prepare the way for the development of integrated “ICT for Development” strategies.  
We focus on two aspects of industrial upgrading found in the literature:  "firm-level upgrading" 
from low-end to higher-end value chain stages, and "industry-level linkages" that provides the social 
capital that is the lifeblood for the individual upgrading firm.
6 We emphasize three additional features that 
distinguish our concept of IU.  First, we use a broad definition of innovation that allows us to move 
beyond a narrow focus on R&D and patenting.
7 There is now a widespread consensus that a broad 
definition of “innovation efforts” is needed that includes engineering, technology purchases, expenditures 
on licensing and consultancy, and technology search, as well as the accumulation of tacit knowledge 
required to absorb imported technology (e.g., Nelson, 1990). That broader focus is necessary to capture 
the proliferation of knowledge-intensive professional services, made possible by ICT. 
Second, we view industrial upgrading as a context-specific concept, with its characteristics 
differing across industrial sectors and countries. This is important, as ICT and globalization have 
substantially extended the geographic dispersion of economic transactions, involving diverse economic 
structures and institutions (Ernst, 1997b). Such diversity is a hallmark of developing Asia. Equally 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commission (e.g., World Bank and OECD, 2000; OECD, 2001). 
6 The other three forms of IU are:  (i) inter-industry upgrading proceeding from low value-added industries (e.g. 
light industries) to higher value-added industries (e.g. heavy and higher-tech industries);  (ii) inter-factor upgrading 
proceeding from endowed assets (i.e., natural resources and unskilled labor) to created assets (physical capital, 
skilled labor, social capital); and (iii) upgrading of demand within a hierarchy of consumption, proceeding from 
necessities to conveniences to luxury goods.  See Ozawa (2000) for discussion of upgrading taxonomies.  Most 
research has focused on a combination of the first two forms of IU, based on a distinction between low-wage, low-
skill “sun-set” industries and high-wage, high-skill “sunrise” industries. Such simple dichotomies however have 
failed to produce convincing results, for two reasons: First, there are low-wage, low-skill value stages in even the 
most high-tech industry, and high-wage, high-skill activities exist even in so-called traditional industries like 
textiles. And second, both the capability requirements and the boundaries of a particular “industry” keep changing 
over time, which makes an analytical focus on the industry level even more problematic.  
7  Most empirical work on IU has explored the expansion of R&D-intensive industries. For most developing 
countries, that narrow focus is of very limited value.The (usually) implicit notion is that potential rates of 
productivity growth are higher in “emergent”, R&D-intensive industries (Globerman, 1997, pages 98 and 99). 
Hence, “… specializing in the “right” technological activities directly contributes to faster growth rates of real 
income”. A related notion is that, for R&D-intensive industries, economic rents can be extracted, in part, from 
  7 important are changes over time, that may not be linear, comprehensive, nor complete.  Third, we include 
firm behavior as a key dimension, allowing for a co-evolution of industry structure and firm behavior in 
response to actions of key participants and also to the policy environment.  
Specialization is an important indicator of the degree of industrial upgrading that a country has 
achieved. Specialization patterns reflect differences in product and production characteristics 
(homogeneous versus differentiated products), and in production characteristics (mass production versus 
flexible production) (see Table 1). The differences, in turn, are based on two criteria -- the complexity of 
technology, and uncertainty about demand.  Differences in product and production characteristics also 
result in different market structures and account for different upgrading potential, i.e., augmenting the 
technological knowledge base and deepening Hirschman-type linkages.  
Table 1.  Specialization-Upgrading Matrix 
The purpose of this exercise becomes clear when we look at the last row of the specialization 
matrix.  While homogenous products have only a limited upgrading potential, in terms of technological 
learning requirements and linkages, the opposite is true for differentiated products. Similar distinctions 
can be made for production processes, with flexible production linked to premium pricing and significant 
profit margins that give rise to substantial upgrading potential. The downside to flexible production, of 
course, is the substantially higher upfront preparatory efforts that are necessary for successful entry. It is 
important to emphasize that causality works both ways -- while a narrow specialization on commodities 
fails to provide sufficient pressure to broaden the domestic knowledge base and to develop forward and 
backward linkages, it is also true that necessary improvements in specialization are constrained by a 
narrow domestic knowledge base and limited linkages, giving rise to a vicious cycle. 
2. LIMITS TO EXPORT- LED PRODUCTION  
  Let us now use this framework to review achievements and limitations (both external and 
domestic ones) of Asia´s export-led electronics production, and to illustrate the resultant mismatch 
between the production and use of ICT. 
2.1. Achievements  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
foreign consumers. A specialization in the “right” technological activities contributes to higher levels of national 
income by promoting more favourable international terms of trade. 
  8 Developing Asia has been highly successful in establishing itself as a major production base and 
export platform in the electronics industry. Compressed into a short period of time, there has been an 
extraordinarily rapid capacity and international market share expansion. The region's production of 
electronics equipment and components has increased tenfold since 1973, compared to a quadrupling of 
production in Japan. Five Asian countries  (Korea, Taiwan, China/Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia) 
today belong to the group of the top ten world electronics producers
8.  
Unsurprisingly, the region's strength is well-established for consumer electronics, which in 
volume terms contributed almost 50% of world production, up from 34% in 1993. This massive expansion 
of production capacity resulted from the relocation of Japanese consumer electronics production, first to 
Southeast Asia (primarily Malaysia and Thailand) and later to China (Ernst, 1997a). It also reflects the 
emergence of Korea as the second largest supplier, followed now by China (and Hong Kong). The really 
intriguing achievements however can be found in high-precision components and industrial electronics, 
such as computer memories (especially DRAM), motherboards, computer data storage and imaging 
products,
9 and advanced displays (like TFT-liquid crystal displays).  
The semiconductor industry figures prominently in East Asian electronics exports (see Table 4).  
In terms of the geographic dispersion of its production sites and markets, the semiconductor industry is 
one of the most globalized industries.  The industry has been characterized by a massive shift of 
production and assembly by US and Japanese firms outside of their respective countries, primarily to 
locations within Asia (e.g., Ernst, 2001e, and Ernst 1983).  Until the financial crisis erupted in 1997, Asia 
had been the fastest growing supplier and consumer of semiconductors, not the U.S. or Japan
10. Less 
                                                            
8 India has not yet been able to leverage its success in software engineering exports to develop a reasonably 
integrated export production base. 
9   Data storage products include hard disk drives (HDD), tape drives, CD-ROM drives, disk media and their related 
components and subassemblies. Imaging output products include printers, facsimile machines and photocopiers, as 
well as multifunctional products with combined printing, facsimile and copier functions plus ink-jet color copiers 
and printers. 
10 Developing Asia´s leading position was briefly re-established during the short recovery from mid-1999 to the fall 
of 2000. Since then, semiconductor production and consumption has drastically declined almost everywhere, with 
China and Malaysia currently remaining the only significant exceptions. (“The Great Chip Glut”, The Economist, 
August 11, 2001, pages 49-50) 
  9 well-known but of equal importance are achievements in other areas -- contract manufacturing,
11 
especially for complex printed circuit board assembly, add-on and multimedia cards, embedded 
controllers, and a variety of specialized electric components (motors and compressors) both for computer 
and consumer products.   
2.2. External Limitations 
These impressive achievements are widely documented (e.g., Matthews and Cho, 2000; Hobday, 
1995; Ernst, 2001g; Ernst and O'Connor, 1989 and 1992).  Yet already since the late 1980s it had 
became clear that the more successful the catching-up, the more it would run into fundamental limitations 
(e.g., Kim Linsu, 1997; Ernst and O'Connor, 1992; Ernst, 1994). Let us first concentrate on external 
limitations. Best known are the external shocks that result from volatile global finance and currency 
markets. Yet, equally important are periodic constraints to exports. In 1997, for instance, the financial and 
currency crisis did not occur in a vacuum.  It was preceded by a drastic fall in the production and export in 
electronics goods (Ernst, 2001g), as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.  East Asian electronics exports growth, 1992 -1998, (y-o-y % change of US$ values)  
As the “New Economy” has given way to a global recession, this has already terminated Asia´s 
recovery from the 1997 crisis. Economic growth rates have dropped alarmingly across Asia; many 
countries are lagging behind the US and Europe and the region is expected to grow at less than 2% 
during 2001 (Thornhill and Burton, 2001) The slow-down has been faster - and painful - than even the 
pessimists feared. Singapore is in recession
12. Taiwan
13, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines have sharply slowing growth. Only China has maintained significant output growth 
because stronger investment (both domestic and foreign) and household spending have more than offset 
a slowdown in exports
14.  
                                                            
11  Contract manufacturers are precision engineering firms that traditionally have focused on PCBA (printed circuit 
board assembly); recently, however they have expanded into the final assembly of PCs (”complete-box-build-and-
ship”).  
12 Singapore`s GDP fell by an annualised 10.1% in the second quarter of 2001 from the first quarter, when it had 
fallen by 11.3%. This meets the technical definition of recession of two successive quarters of contraction. This 
contrasts with a GDP growth of 9.9% in 2000. How unexpected this slide into recession has been, can be seen from 
the fact that the government, as late as April 2001, had forecast growth to be between 3.5-5.5%. 
13 The country´s second quarter GDP contracted by 2.35%, its worst fall in 25 years (“US Slowdown Buffets 
Taiwan”, banner headline, Financial Times, August 18, 2001, p.1). 
14 For 2001, China is expected to sustain GDP growth of 7.5%. 
  10 The global electronics market which used to act as a major engine of Asia`s exports (Ernst, 
2001g), is now in free fall. In July 2001, the world electronics industry was expected to shrink by up to 
25% during the year, its worst performance ever (data are courtesy of Gartner`s Group Dataquest). 
During the first quarter of 2001, US ICT investment fell by 15% on a quarter-over-quarter annualised 
basis. This has let to a drastic fall in US exports and imports. April 2001 brought the biggest monthly fall 
in US exports and imports since 1992
15, which highlights how serious a threat Asia´s export-oriented 
economies are facing. This has resulted in a demand collapse for Asian electronics exports
16 (Tables 
3a,b,c,d).  
Tables 3 a,b,c,d The Impact of Trade Recession 
The big difference to 1997 is that all major economies (US, Japan and Europe) are now 
experiencing a simultaneous slow-down, if not recession. As a result, Asian currency depreciations that 
facilitated trade adjustment after the 1997 crisis, can no longer help to increase exports. As one analyst 
puts it: ”No matter, how cheap you go, no demand is still no demand.” 
17. A second important difference is 
that, ironically, it is the more sophisticated and open economies with a high exposure to the global ICT 
cycle that are most at risk. The higher the share of ICT in a country´s exports, the more vulnerable the 
country currently appears to trade recession. This is true for Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia, countries 
with a high share of ICT in total merchandise exports. The region`s heavy reliance on ICT exports reflects 
a growing integration into the global production networks of leading electronics corporations, primarily 
from the US (Ernst and Guerrieri, 1998; Ernst and Ravenhill, 1999). It is thus no surprise that the global 
recession in electronics markets has hit especially hard those countries that are most integrated into 
these networks, i.e. Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea and China
18.  
In both periods, the fall in Asian exports certainly reflect a substantially more adverse 
international environment. In 1996, the fall in world export growth from its cyclical peak in 1995 was the 
largest in the past 15 years -- from about 20% to about 4% in US dollars in just one year (World Bank, 
                                                            
15 According to Department of Commerce data, US imports fell 2.2% to $119.1 bn in April 2001, while exports 
sank 2% to $ 86.9bn, the sharpest one-month fall in the volume of US trade since November 1992, when the 
country was struggling out of recession. 
16 As the Financial Times puts it (Jacob, Dickie and Leahy, 2001), “the slowdown in US information technology 
spending spreads at internet speeds to Asia.”. 
17 Chang Weimin, head of research at ING Baring in Taipei, quoted in the Financial Times, July 12, 2001. 
  11 1998). Before the 1997 crisis, the region's currencies were pegged to the US dollar. Consequently, some 
Asian countries experienced an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, due partly to the sharp 
depreciation of the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar, and partly to the renminbi devaluation in 1994 which hurt 
the region`s exports. The sharp depreciation of the yen in 1995 compounded the negative impact of the 
slowdown in world exports on many East Asian countries.
19 During the 2000/2001 recession, the US-
dollar peg is no longer a concern, except for Hong Kong. The real threat is a disruptive and prolonged fall 
in the US -dollar. By increasing the price of US imports, this could severely hurt developing Asia´s export-
oriented electronics industries 
A hostile global competitive environment thus poses important constraints for export-led growth 
of Asia`s electronics industries. Equally important, however, are domestic constraints: fundamental 
drawbacks of East Asia's successful catching-up strategies have produced a mismatch between the 
production and use of ICT. 
3. MISMATCH BETWEEN PRODUCTION AUND USE OF ICT: DRAW-BACKS OF CATCHING-
UP STRATEGIES 
Three fundamental drawbacks characterize developing Asia`s successful catching-up strategies 
in the electronics industry (Ernst, 2001g): a sticky specialization on exportable “commodities”, a narrow 
domestic knowledge base and limited forward and backward linkages. Together, these draw-backs have 
produced a fundamental mismatch between the production and use of ICT, giving rise to developing 
Asia`s multiple digital divides. 
3.1. Sticky Specialization 
The region`s successful entry into the electronics industry was based on a forced march to 
develop a “mass production” capacity that could serve high-growth export markets for homogeneous 
products. Very little upgrading occurred into higher-end and rapidly growing market segments for 
differentiated products and services that require flexible (or customized) production (such design-
intensive ICs and computer products, software and Internet services). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 Outside of Asia, similar negative trade effects can be found for other major supply bases of US global networks, 
such as Mexico, Ireland, Israel, and Costa Rica. 
19   This is especially so for Korea whose export structure is similar to Japan´s: in 1996, Japan´s imports from Korea 
fell by 8.5%. Throughout the period 1990 to 1997, Korea´s real export growth mirrors changes in the yen-dollar 
  12 Korea pushed this strategy to the extreme (Kim Linsu, 2000; Ernst, 1994 and 1998).  A handful of 
multi-sector, family-owned business groups (or chaebol) were given privileged access to large amounts 
of long-term debt capital. This shaped key features of the chaebol’s strategy in terms of product 
specialization. Almost without exception, the chaebol have targeted those segments of the electronics 
industry that require huge investment outlays and sophisticated mass production techniques for fairly 
homogeneous products (“commodities”) like microwave ovens, TV sets, VCRs, computer monitors, 
picture tubes and computer memories, especially DRAMs. Overwhelmingly, the focus has been on 
consumer electronics and components, with only limited inroads into industrial electronics. Burdened with 
unimpressive “me too” products, the chaebol have all failed to establish themselves as credible 
competitors in the more design-intensive sectors of the computer industry. 
Trade data for the region`s leading electronics producers confirm a highly concentrated (“sticky”) 
product specialization (Table 4). To start with, electronics dominates merchandise exports, ranging from 
almost 29% in Korea to more than 61% in Singapore. Moreover, product specialization is heavily 
concentrated within electronics. In Korea, three products dominate with a very high RCA: semiconductors 
(SC) with 3.6, components (Comp) with 2.7, and consumer electronics (CE), with 2.0. And, almost 61% of 
Korea's electronics exports consist of components, with semiconductors (SC) alone accounting for 40%.  
Other East Asian economies exhibited a similar pattern.  
 
Table 4.  Developing Asia´s Trade Specialization Profiles:  RCA and Leading Export 
Products  
A particularly disturbing feature of developing Asia`s specialization is a fundamental mismatch 
between the production and use of ICT. Take semiconductors. Korea, the region`s leading producer, 
exports more than 90% of its total semiconductor output, while at the same time it imports more than 
87% of its domestic demand (Ernst, 2001, Doner book). While Korea´s exports focus on commodity 
devices like computer memories (especially DRAM, the industry`s “bleeding-edge”), the country`s 
semiconductor imports are dominated by differentiatetd, design-intensive products like microprocessors, 
ASIC, digital signal processors, and “systems-on-a-chip” devices. There is a long list of similar 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
exchange rate, rising with an appreciation of the yen, and falling with its depreciation (World Bank, 1998, figure 
  13 mismatches for all major electronics producers in the region. Such an extreme imbalance between supply 
and demand makes it very difficult to broaden and deepen forward and backward linkages within the 
electronics industry and to place that industry onto a more viable basis. The supply-demand mismatch 
also obstructs attempts to reduce the region´s multiple “digital divides”. 
In short, developing Asia's competitive position in electronics production remains highly fragile, 
despite impressive achievements. As long as the region's electronics industries continue to rely on 
commodity-type products like TV sets, monitors or DRAMs, this sticky specialization constrains limited 
possibilities for industrial upgrading. For such commodities, competition is of a fairly conventional nature, 
with size, economies of scale and first mover advantages being of primary importance rather than R&D or 
knowledge-intensive support services. 
It is probably fair to say that much of developing Asia´s electronics industry represents a modern 
version of the classical “mono-product export enclave”, characterized by a minimum of linkages with the 
domestic economy. True, the dependence on traditional labor-intensive commodities (like toys and 
garments) or primary commodities has been reduced. Yet, a new and potentially quite destructive 
dependence on high-tech commodities has emerged. This reflects an important difference with the 
classical “export enclave” -- the cost of entering the electronics industry is horrendously high (especially 
for high-precision components like semiconductors), and certainly exceeds that of entering the plantation 
industry. And even higher is the cost of continuously upgrading the industry, and of maintaining the 
competitiveness of its exports.  
3.2. Narrow Domestic Knowledge Base 
A second important characteristic is the limited and achievable technological learning 
requirements.
20  A focus on mass-produced commodities (like DRAM) requires a narrow set of 
capabilities -- a capacity to absorb and upgrade imported foreign technology and to develop operational 
capabilities in production, investment and minor adaptations. The main objective has been to accumulate 
superior production capabilities and to become a quick, lower-cost follower for established product and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2.2., p.21) 
20 One needs to distinguish the increasing sophistication of the institutional arrangements for technological learning, 
especially for international technology sourcing, and the relatively mundane contents of the knowledge thus 
generated. In line with the theory of the path dependency of innovation, it is hardly surprising to find that most of 
  14 system designs and component technology, through reverse engineering and subcontracting (especially 
OEM).  
This has resulted in three main weaknesses that characterize the region's knowledge base:  (i) 
an insufficient critical mass of R&D and patenting;  (ii) gross inefficiencies of corporate technology 
management; and (iii) equally important inefficiencies of its public innovation system.  Take Korea, the 
region`s leader in per capita R&D expenditures. Korea's p.c. R&D expenditures of $176.2 (in 1993) lag 
well behind those of Japan ($762.9 in 1992) and the US ($540.9) (Lall, 1997). Korea still badly trails 
major OECD countries, with a patent intensity of 10 only a fraction of that reported for Germany (around 
180), Japan (170), the US (140), and the UK and France (slightly below 100)
21 This gap is likely to 
increase, as the financial crisis has dried up funds available for this “patent portfolio race”. 
Inefficiencies of corporate knowledge management spillover into production inefficiencies, 
delaying product design cycles and speed-to-market. Feedback loops across the value chain thus remain 
weak and unreliable, and design, marketing and manufacturing often proceed in an asynchronous way. 
Finally, important inefficiencies in the public innovation system, like a lack of coordination among R&D 
programs of different ministries and inconsequential implementation, have given rise to a wastage of 
scarce financial and human resources. Fundamental weaknesses in the training- and education systems 
have led to a widespread brain drain. While examples of successful reverse brain drain exist ( especially 
in the region`s NIEs), there is often limited scope for positive feedback effects from overseas expatriates. 
What matters for our purposes is that a narrow domestic knowledge base has made it difficult to 
move up the ladder of specialization. It also erodes export competitiveness, and constrains the 
development of linkages, perpetuating a heavy dependence on input imports. 
3.3. Limited Linkages 
A third important structural weakness is a lack of forward and backward linkages, especially for 
materials and production equipment, that gives rise to a persistently high dependence on input imports. 
The result is an inverted production pyramid -- a huge and rapidly growing final product sector that rests 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
this knowledge has been confined to operational production capabilities of a fairly conventional mass production 
type, which after all has been the region´s original advantage. 
21   The measure of patent intensity for OECD countries, Triad patents, refers to high quality patents, i.e. world 
market-oriented patents registered in at least two overseas markets within the Triad region. In other words, the gap 
between G7 countries and Korea is even higher than shown by a mere quantitative comparison. 
  15 on a weak and much smaller domestic base of support industries. Rapid growth in the final products 
sector necessitates considerable imports of intermediates and production equipment. 
While import content ratios are not available,
22 it is possible to construct proxy indicators. Table 5 
documents the critical role played by electronic components, and especially semiconductors (SC) both for 
electronics imports and merchandise imports. It is important to emphasize that these shares are highest 
for the region's four leading electronics producers (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia). On the 
positive side, this of course reflects the more sophisticated product mix of these four industry leaders, 
with industrial electronics outweighing consumer products. It raises, however, an important consideration 
of why rapid capacity and international market share expansion for final products in developing Asia was 
not matched by a progressive reduction in input imports. 
Table 5. Dependence on Input Imports 
An important reason are peculiar features of the electronics industry that have intensified the 
vicious circle, discussed earlier, between sticky specialization, a narrow domestic knowledge base and 
limited linkages. I am referring to short product cycles, combined with rapid and often disruptive 
technological change (Christensen, 1997; Ernst, 2001e). The result is that a latecomer cannot count on a 
continuous decline of capital goods imports. Such imports, on the contrary, are likely to increase 
periodically, with each shift to a new product generation, with each extension of the product mix, and with 
each substantial change in technology. The same is true for the imports of those key components that are 
essential for the cost and performance features of a particular product. 
  Consider a simple model of the latecomer trajectory of input imports in the electronics industry. 
Input imports cover both key components and machinery. Suppose country K decides to establish local 
production for a certain key component Ct required for a particular product Pt. And suppose further that K 
has sufficiently strong companies that can cope with the substantial entry barriers that characterize the 
production of Ct  - an assumption that surely cannot be taken for granted. Even then, catching-up 
requires a certain period of time. As a latecomer, country K may thus end up in a paradoxical situation, in 
that once it has finally succeeded in producing a substantial part of Ct required for Pt, the industry may 
                                                            
22   Import content ratios differ from product to product, and even for a given product, they differ from company to 
company. This obviously poses severe methodological problems for the collection of such data. An important 
  16 already have moved on to the next product generation(s) Pt2 or Pt3, which require substantially more 
sophisticated key components Ct2 or Ct3. This does not imply that catching-up efforts have been in vain.  
Learning and capability formation has taken place, which country K can build upon.  What it implies, 
however, is that country K will remain dependent on imported inputs of Ct2 and Ct3, until it has finally 
caught up to their more sophisticated requirements. At that stage, K's import dependence is likely to shift 
to Ct4, Ct5, and so on. 
A high dependence on input imports thus constitutes the Achilles' heel of developing Asia's 
export-led catching-up in electronics. This explains why capacity and international market share 
expansion may well produce significant trade deficits and why exchange rates may come under 
downward pressure, even if economic growth rates rise. As long as this structure is preserved, this will 
constrain the scope for industrial upgrading. To break out of this vicious circle, it is necessary to reduce 
the mismatch between the production and use of ICT  
 
4. ASIA´S MULTIPLE DIGITAL DIVIDES
23 
A key feature of that mismatch is that only limited linkages have been established between 
export-oriented supply clusters and the rest of the economy. Asia´s electronics exporters have used their 
prowess in electronics production to paper over the failings of inefficient traditional and service sectors
24 
This lack of linkages explains the persistence of serious “digital divides”. These divides separate 
developing Asia from industrialized countries, and the poor countries in the region from the more 
developed ones. They also exclude rural areas, and lower income groups from access to information. 
4.1. What is at Stake? 
Most research on the “digital divide” has focused on the exclusion, in the U.S. and other 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
objective for future research is to conduct a questionnaire survey to collect a representative set of product-specific 
import content ratios and to document how these ratios have developed over time. 
23 If not indicated otherwise, data in this section are taken from the following sources: Boston Consulting Group, 
2001a and 2001b; ITU, Yearbook of Statistics, 1995 to 2001; ITU, 1999, “Internet for Development”. Internet 
Software Consortium (isc.org), Nua Internet Surveys (nus.i.e), American Electronics Association (aea.org), 
Cybernation v.2.0; Internet Software Consortium (isc.org); www.netcraft.com; Dataquest (Gartner group); IDC; 
Yearbook of the Information Technology Industry Council (1998), Washington, D.C; Cheung, 2000; Oki, 2001; 
Cheskin Research, 2000;  
24 These weaknesses have been brutally exposed by external shocks, like the 1997 financial crisis and the 2001 trade 
recession. Take Taiwan where a drastic fall in electronics exports has forced a reconsideration of export-led growth, 
and a renewed urgency to search for broad-based IU options. 
  17 industrialized countries, of lower-tier income groups, women and ethnic minorities (e.g., NTIA, 1999). Of 
equal importance however is unequal geographic dispersion that indicates a global digital divide: Outside 
the industrial heartlands of the U.S., Japan and Europe, fundamental constraints exist to access (spread 
and capacity of information infrastructure), connectivity (variety of linkages) and receptivity (capacity to 
receive and absorb information). A few highly ICT-enabled lead regions are separated from the so-called 
RoW (= rest of the world) that lacks the capacity to benefit from ICT. Take Internet access: almost 90% is 
concentrated in North America, Western Europe and Japan. Developing Asia, despite its successful 
catching-up in industrial manufacturing, lags way behind: with almost two thirds of the world population, 
the region accounts for a meager 7% share of the total Internet population (Nua Internet Surveys). 
The region´s limited access to the Internet is demonstrated by the fact that there is only one 
direct Internet link between two Asian cities, Tokyo and Seoul. More than 99% of the international Internet 
traffic in Asia is routed through the US (Chismar, 2000: p. 3). This will slow down access of Asian firms to 
broad bandwidth, which is essential for reaping the benefits of Internet-based information systems. A 
dependence on U.S. backbone networks constrains the region´s capacity to adjust the evolving Internet 
architecture to the specific needs and capabilities of its firms and public sectors. It will also make it more 
difficult to develop a strong regional pool of hardware and software companies that provide Internet 
infrastructure equipment. 
Equally important are intra-regional divides: substantial disparities are also emerging within 
developing Asia itself. For instance, Hong Kong and Singapore have 57 fixed phone lines per 100 
inhabitants, while India has three. Singapore and Australia have 56 and 54 PCs per 100 inhabitants 
respectively, while Indonesia and the Philippines have less than one. Wireless device penetration also 
varies greatly, with 68 and 67 wireless devices per 100 inhabitants in Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
respectively, and under one wireless devices per 100 inhabitants in India. Internet access costs also vary 
across the region. For example, in low-income countries, like India and Indonesia, Internet access costs
25 
represent around 120% and 50%, respectively, of monthly GDP per capita. And the average Internet user 
in China has to spend around 20% of monthly income to get online for only one hour each day (Ernst and 
                                                            
25 Internet access costs = ISP charges + call charges + PC amortisation cost.  
  18 Jiacheng, 2000, p.5). Compare this to the average Internet user in the U.S. who spends roughly 1-2% of 
monthly income for unlimited access to the Web and for monthly telephone charges. 
There are also important intra-regional disparities in terms of Internet users. Table 6 shows that 
China´s 16.9 million Internet users in mid 2000, while an impressive figure, was actually only 1.3% of the 
total population.  To equal Taiwan´s 29% share of total population, the number of mainland Chinese 
online would have to rise to 377 million. 
Table 6: Comparison of Internet users as a Percentage of Total Population 
 
Intra-regional divides are especially pronounced for ICT business applications. For instance, 
Korea’s e-business market is projected to be 2.5 times the size of China’s by 2005, and larger than the 
combined markets of Singapore, the rest of Southeast Asia, India, and Hong Kong. This reflects Korea’s 
higher stage of development, its broader knowledge base, and its more robust national information 
infrastructure.  
Most importantly, such intra-regional digital divides are expected to grow rapidly. For instance, 
while Taiwan´s wireless device penetration is projected to grow from 68% in 2001 to 84% in 2004, that 
ration in India will increase from 0.3% to only 0.6%. However, given India´s enormous population, this 
small percentage increase translates into about three million new users. There seems to be a clear trend 
for intra-regional digital divides to increase with the sophistication and complexity of the ICT systems. For 
instance, attempts to push broadband in developed Asian economies like Korea, Japan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong will also widen inequality. By 2004, broadband penetration is forecast to reach 35% of the 
total population in Korea, 17% in Japan and Singapore, and 14% in Hong Kong. Broadband access 
however will remain off limits for the great majority of Asian populations. 
4.2. Implications 
These multiple digital divides indicate that countries and firms in developing Asia, on average, fail 
to use ICT effectively to upgrade production and economic institutions. There is a huge, underutilized 
potential to establish ICT as an engine of economic growth and welfare. Second, intra-regional divides 
are arguably more extreme than extra-regional divides. Highly ICT-enabled clusters in countries like 
Singapore, Korea and Taiwan contrast with ICT deserts in most of the Mekong Delta and South Asia. ICT 
  19 has added yet another dimension to the deeply engrained regional disparities within the region. These 
disparities constitute the most demanding challenge for long-term economic development. As long as 
they exist, it will be difficult for the region´s leading economies to move away from a heavy reliance on 
extra-regional electronics exports. It is thus grossly misleading, as many observers do, to contrast and 
compare indicators for, one the one hand, Asian countries (including Japan), and, on the other hand, for 
non-Asian countries. 
Third, Asian NIEs, with the exception of Singapore, lag substantially behind the U.S. and 
European leaders (especially the Nordic countries), in terms of Internet hosts, PCs and Internet users, as 
well as E-business readiness. Yet, NIEs are rapidly catching-up, having reached a level that is roughly 
comparable to that of Japan. A fourth important implication is that we need policies that address the huge 
regional disparities, in terms of ICT readiness, that exist, especially within  large, quasi-continental 
economies like China and India
26. For instance, within India, there is a huge gap in ICT readiness 
between the Southern belt (especially clusters around Bombay, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Trivandrum and 
Madras) and the rest of this sub-continent. Within China, equally extreme disparities are reported (e.g., 
Hachigian, 2001). 
All of this implies that, fifth and most importantly, a majority of Asian populations remains cut off 
from access to ICT. That majority also lacks the appropriate knowledge to reap potential ICT benefits. For 
many of these people, the main challenge is day-to-day survival. Disposable income is simply too low to 
invest in even the most simple ICT device. Typically, this creates economic and social institutions that 
obstruct trust required for conducting ICT-based economic transactions. These findings raise important 
policy issues, to which we will turn in the concluding section of the paper. 
4.3. Lack of Relevant Data: Priorities for Research 
Before, however, we need to add an important caveat: there is a serious lack of relevant data that 
systematically analyze developmental impacts of ICT. To understand precisely how the above multiple 
digital divides affect developing Asia´s long-term economic growth and welfare, we have to move beyond 
the above rough indicators. Future research needs to develop a more systematic set of data needs that 
measure how different countries and micro-regions differ in their capacity to reap the benefits of ICT.  
  20 a) Classifying digital divides 
We need to classify developing Asia`s diverse digital divides. Understanding this diversity 
matters. Most of the literature looks only at highly aggregated quantitative indicators that focus on the 
input side.  This can be grossly misleading. Of primary importance are those divides that reduce or 
obstruct the appropriate choice of ICT applications and their effective implementation. 
The key term is readiness, which consolidates three inter-related prerequisites for the effective 
use of ICT: access, knowledge, and trust
27. “Access” includes both physical access (to 
telecommunications infrastructure and networks such as the Internet) and economic access (such as a 
non-prohibitive price structure for Internet use or low tariffs for ICT imports). “Knowledge” refers to the 
accumulated knowledge of ICT users and institutional arrangements for sharing such knowledge. Finally, 
“trust” is the most important element that defies however quantitative measurement. Trust encompasses 
all issues related to the security and confidentiality of transactions; authentication and encryption; 
intellectual property rights (especially the prevalence of “software piracy”); and, most importantly, the 
appropriateness of legal and regulatory frameworks. 
b) Indicators 
We suggest to distinguish three sets of indicators: ICT readiness; e-business readiness; and the 
match between production and use of ICT (see table 7). Under “ICT readiness”, we measure five 
indicators of physical access, i.e. penetration ratios for fixed telephone lines, mobile phones, Internet 
hosts, PCs and Internet users; two indicators of economic access, i.e. monthly Internet access charges 
and per capita GDP; proxy indicators for the sophistication of accumulated user knowledge, i.e. combined 
first-, second, and third-level gross enrollment ratios; and, finally, a proxy indicator for trust, estimated 
software piracy rates. Under “E-business readiness”, we collect data on four indicators: number of secure 
servers per 1,000; the size of combined ERP and ASP markets; the status of licenses for 2.5G and 3G 
systems; and estimates on investment in broadband infrastructure.  
Table 7 Digital Divides - Indicators 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
26 This points to an important priority for future research. We need to collect disaggregated data for individual Asian 
countries that highlight the digital divides that separate lead regions from the rest of these countries. 
  21 Finally, the last set of indicators measure whether there is a reasonable match between the use 
and the production of ICT. We suggest the following metrics: the share of ICT investment in GDP, as an 
overall measure of an economy`s degree of digitalization; sector distribution of ICT investment 
(comparing ICT producers and non-ICT producers); employment figures for the ICT producing sector; 
aggregated ICT employment (including ICT use and maintenance, and the outsourcing of ICT system 
management); and investment and R&D by ICT producers. 
c) Coverage 
We suggest that these data are collected for eight country groupings: I. Asian NIEs (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea); II. China; III. ASEAN-4 (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines); IV. India; V. Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia); VI. the U.S.; VII. The EU-12; and 
VIII. Japan. To get an idea of the underlying dynamics, this exercise should cover three distinct periods: I. 
pre-Financial crisis (1994 - 1997); II. Post- crisis recovery (1998- 1.Half of 2000); and III. The decline of 
the “New Economy” and trade recession (since 2.half of 2000). We need such time series to establish 
whether certain digital divides have been reduced over time, and which divides have kept growing. 
 
5. POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
  We have documented that a focus on export-led production of electronics goods no longer 
guarantees sustained growth and welfare improvements. Fundamental changes are required in 
developing Asia`s “ICT for Development” strategies. It is time to match a focus on production with the 
development of effective demand for ICT investment within the region. Conscious efforts are required to 
reduce the region`s extreme reliance on electronics exports to the US, and to increase sales to Asian 
markets
28. 
Equally important is the development and continuous upgrading of an ICT production sector. 
While manufacturing continues to matter, the focus of attention needs to shift gradually toward the 
development of high value-added, knowledge-intensive support services (KISS) ( Ernst, 2001f). Such 
services encompass software engineering, product design and engineering, and organizational 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 This conceptualization draws on the following sources: UNCTAD, 2000, chapter 3; OECD, 2000, chapter 3; 
OECD, 2001; and ITU, 1999. 
  22 innovations like quality control, inventory and supply chain management. The weak state of KISS in Asia 
reflects a bias of investment in plant and equipment relative to investment in intangible assets. The latter 
include the development of specialized skills and continuous higher education, and conscious efforts to 
develop patents and brand names as part of strategic marketing strategies (e.g., Dahlman and 
Andersson, 2000: chapters 6 and 7). 
These elements define a new integrated  “ICT for Development” strategy that is necessary to 
reduce the region`s multiple and persistent digital divides. The region`s diversity implies that this strategy 
comes in different shades and colors. Implementing such strategies poses daunting political and 
administrative challenges. Most importantly, hard choices are required about priorities, sequencing and 
opportunity costs. The following observations are meant to facilitate that task.  
5.1. Diversity 
In light of the diversity of Asian developing countries and their development experiences (Naya, 
Mark, McCleery, 2001), and in light of the region`s multiple digital divides, there is obviously no “one-size-
fits-all” approach to ICT-enabled industrial upgrading. Instead, we need a flexible mix of diverse 
approaches. This reflects substantial differences that separate countries, for instance in terms of size, 
stage of development, industry structure, “openness” (exposure to trade and FDI), and knowledge base. 
These differences give rise to unequal capacities to reap the benefits of ICT. To capture these 
differences, it is useful to distinguish first- and second-tier newly-industrializing economies (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand), quasi-continental economies (China, including Hong Kong, 
and India), and poor economies (like Vietnam). 
Equally important is a taxonomy of economic agents involved in the region`s production and use 
of ICT. We suggest to distinguish global corporations; large local conglomerates; small local firms; 
diverse government and public sector agencies; international development agencies; and operational 
NGOs with a specialized expertise. The taxonomy highlights some fundamental differences in terms of 
size, decision-making power, financial clout, technological capabilities and market access. Clearly some 
of these agents are “more equal than others”, to paraphrase George Orwell, in terms of their capacity to 
shape and benefit from the use and production of ICT. We need empirical research that explores the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
28 Note however that, in Asia, a large share of intra-regional electronics trade should not be confused with a large 
  23 structural and contextual factors that shape the distribution of economic power among these agents, and 
how this distribution is changing over time
29. This research will enable us to distinguish how key features 
of integrated strategies differ, depending on whether they are applied in poor countries or in mature 
economies.  
5.2. ICT for Development - How to Move From Partial to Integrated Strategies? 
  A recent study, co-edited by the UNDP, Accenture (the global consulting firm), and the Markle 
Foundation, argues that an integrated “ICT for Development” strategy “is the most effective way to benefit 
from synergies and ensure the impact of ICT deployment is optimized.” (UNDP, 2001, p.29). We agree 
with this statement, but contend that the key to such synergies is to reduce the mismatch between the 
production and use of ICT. This has important implications for strategy design and policy implementation. 
We argue that, while partial strategies may work for a while, they are insufficient to generate long-term 
economic growth and welfare improvements. A transition is necessary from partial to integrated strategies 
of “ICT for development”. Such strategies should center on reducing the mismatch between the 
production and use of ICT within the region. To effectively implement such strategies, it is necessary to 
develop a broad set of knowledge-intensive support services (KISS), as described above. It is also 
necessary to link investments in ICT to the development of local capabilities and markets. 
A taxonomy of “ICT for Development” strategies and sequencing patterns can help to clarify this 
issue (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: ICT for Development: A Taxonomy of Strategies and Sequencing Patterns 
 
The figure provides an important insight that should structure future research and policy design. 
While most countries initially pursued partial strategies, over time, the more successful countries have 
moved up to integrated strategies. It is also important to emphasize the diversity of possible sequencing 
and upgrading patterns. Important differences exist for instance between upgrading strategies pursued in 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia
30. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
share of final product sales to Asian markets. For evidence, see Ernst and Guerrieri, 1998. 
29 For a stylized taxonomy of Asia`s electronics firms, see Ernst, 2001g, Annex 2. 
30See Kim 1997 and Ernst, 1994 and 2001h; Ernst, 2000, and Chen and Chen, 2001 (on Taiwan); Wong, 2000 (on 
Singapore); and Best, 2001 and Rasiah, 2000 (on Malaysia). 
  24 Yet, apart from these NIEs, very little is known about diverse upgrading options, and about the 
drivers and impacts of these processes. For instance, a review (Heeks, 2001) of the proceedings of the 
main “ICT for development “ conferences (e.g., Odedra-Straub, 1996; Avgerou and Walsham, 2000) and 
relevant journals, like Information Technology for Development, and Electronic Journal on Information 
Systems in Developing Countries, shows that most contributions have been largely descriptive case 
studies of specific problems of ICT implementation. The remaining articles somewhat subserviently apply 
some of the currently fashionable grand social science theories, with little concern for policy implications. 
Attempts to apply economic theory to these issues fare only slightly better. At least, they highlight 
some disturbing puzzles. For instance, Pohjola (2000) finds that, while ICT investment appears to boost 
growth in developed countries, the same is not necessarily true for developing countries. Other studies, 
like Quibria and Tschang (2001: p.27) emphasize the obvious: “… to reap the full benefits of the ICT 
revolution and reduce poverty, countries need to address the main impediments to economic 
development” , such as bottlenecks in infrastructure and education, and market intransparencies. But 
there is almost no attempt to trace the drivers and impacts of diverse “ICT for Development” strategies, 
and to assess their strengths and weaknesses
31. 
In light of these limitations of our knowledge, let us look at three illustrative examples of possible 
sequencing approaches from partial to integrated strategies: attempts by Asian NIEs to move from 
export-led production to ICT-enabled upgrading of economic structures and institutions
32; attempts to 
replicate the “New Economy” model; and attempts to move from poverty alleviation strategies to ICT-
enabled industrial upgrading strategies. This exercise can help us to separate misguided illusions from 
feasible options. 
5.3.  From Export-Led Production to ICT-Enabled Upgrading 
The transition from partial to integrated strategies is nicely illustrated by Asia´s first- and second-
tier NIEs. A common feature of these countries is that they started out initially with a focus on developing 
                                                            
31 Of greater relevance are earlier contributions on the role of technology for economic development that however 
do not address explicitly the specific ICT-related issues, such Bell and Pavitt (1993), Nelson and Pack (1995), and 
the contributions in Ernst, Ganiatsos and Mytelka, 1998. On ICT specifically, see various contributions to Bartzokas 
and Teubal, 2002, and a series of studies jointly published by the OEDCD and the World Bank on the transition to 
“knowledge-based economies (e.g., Dahlman and Andersson, 2001), and Ernst, 2001 c and d. 
  25 export-led clusters for ICT “commodities”. This approach has been a major strength, as it established a 
virtuous circle between quick learning and late market entry. A narrow specialization on exportable ICT 
commodities combined with limited linkages and learning requirements, was necessary to overcome 
initial latecomer disadvantages. This was the only realistic entry possibility, as it guaranteed access to 
rapidly growing and relatively open export markets. It also helped to keep manageable the scope and 
depth of technological learning.  For quite a while, this strategy has produced substantial benefits that 
were the envy of the rest of the developing world: new jobs and skills, rapid growth and improved balance 
of payments, in the context of reasonable macro-economic stability 
That strategy however has now reached its limits. As documented in this report, a bias in favor of 
“commodity” manufacturing reduces the scope for value creation (or profit margins), due to an emerging 
“commodity trap” (Ernst, 2001g): ICT commodities like DRAM are prone to deflationary pricing pressures 
resulting from periodic over-capacity and price wars. This restricts the pool of financial and human 
resources available for continuous upgrading efforts. As a result, all of these mature economies now 
experiment with different approaches to use ICT as a catalyst for promoting the development of 
knowledge-intensive support services (KISS). For instance, Korea is trying to forge ahead with wireless 
Internet applications, based on broadband infrastructure.  And Singapore and Taiwan are promoting 
Internet-enabled e-business applications. 
 
5.4. Unfulfilled Promises of the “New Economy” 
We also need to beware of “technological determinism” that makes ICT an “icon for modern 
development” (Heeks, 1999:15), neglecting opportunity costs, negative impacts and the potential for 
failure.  There is still a widespread belief in developing Asia that copying the US-style “New Economy” 
model could do wonders for attempts to move beyond partial strategies (e.g., Sender, 2001). So deeply 
entrenched is that belief that it has survived the dramatic slow-down of key sectors of the “New Economy” 
(especially telecommunications and computers).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
32 For research on attempts by large, quasi-continental economies like China, India to move from domestic market 
and capability development, via the development of export-led clusters to more broad-based forms of ICT-enabled 
IU, see Lu Qiwen, 2000, Gu and Steinmueller, 1997, and D`Costa, forthcoming. 
  26 This is ironic in light of the fact that in the US, and especially on Wall Street and in Silicon Valley, 
the debate has moved on. The emerging consensus is that the concept of the “New Economy” is buried 
under a long list of unfulfilled promises (table 8). Alice Rivlin, a former vice chair of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, and a co-author of a major study of the productivity effects of the Internet (Litan and Rivlin, 
2001), argues that much of the “New Economy” propositions are “hopes and hunches” (quoted in the 
Financial Times, September 3, 2001, p.2).   And for Martin Bailey, former head of the White House 
Council of Economic Advisors, and an expert on productivity, the decline of U.S. productivity growth since 
late 2000 indicates that “the favourable performance of the 90`s could unravel, with higher inflation, 
higher unemployment, slower growth, stock market weakness and a dollar that could drop sharply.” 
(quoted in the Financial Times, September 6, 2001, p.5). 
This new consensus culminates in three questions that should inform policy debates in 
developing Asia: How long will it take to correct the previous over-investment in ICT? Will productivity 
gains survive, as we move into a global recession? Or does the productivity decline during the first half of 
2001 signal a reversal to a downward spiral?
33  
Table 8: Unfulfilled Promises 
A widely known example of Asia´s attempts to copy the “New Economy” model is Malaysia`s 
attempt to establish a $40 billion Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) that was supposed to transform major 
sectors of the economy. In 1996, the government had hired McKinsey, the global consulting firm, to draft 
a blueprint for a 15-kilometer-by-50-kilometer strip intended to be Malaysia`s answer to  Silicon Valley. 
$3.7bn have been consumed thus far, but results are disappointing. To the embarrassment of the 
Malaysian government, a leaked confidential report by the very same company that designed the project 
(McKinsey) concluded that the Multimedia Super Corridor “ had not attracted much interest from global 
investors, nor made an impact on the domestic economy.” (Prystay, 2001) 
Even more influential has been the idea that, by establishing Nasdaq-type second boards to 
foster innovative start-up companies, Asia could catch up in reaping “New Economy” benefits. Especially 
after the financial crisis, Asian firms have increasingly relied on stock to finance capacity and upgrading 
                                                            
33 Many financial analysts now argue that U.S. productivity growth will subside to the lower levels that existed 
before the “New Economy” boom. For instance, Stephen Roach, chief economist at Morgan Stanley in New York, 
  27 investments. Even more important, there was a rush into IPO and venture capital-funded business start-
ups. Since Nasdaq began to crash, however, these attempts to copy the US system of stock market-
based innovation finance are in shambles. As long as Nasdaq boomed, Asian technology stocks followed 
suit. But once prices of US technology stocks fell, the market capitalization of Asian electronics firms fell a 
lot harder than their US counterparts. This has drastically changed the composition of Asian stock 
markets: technology stocks now make up a much smaller percentage of market capitalization. Take 
Korea. In July 2001, the share of technology stocks in MSCI`s Korea Free Index has fallen to 32%, down 
from 44% in July 2000. This raises an important question: How will the breakdown of the “New 
Economy”-type system of finance, centered on IPO, VC and Nasdaq-type boards, affect innovation and 
industrial upgrading in the region? Will this drain available scarce resources even further? And what 
options exist for Asian firms to circumvent these constraints? 
In short, attempts to replicate the US-style “New Economy” are unlikely to provide a short-cut to a 
sustainable integrated strategy. As the current downturn of the US ICT sector demonstrates, it may be an 
advantage that Asian countries and firms have not blindly followed the US over- investment in ICT. 
Maybe being one or two steps behind in certain areas, like highly sophisticated and capital-intensive ERP 
(enterprise resource planning) systems, may not hurt. Maybe, moving ahead at a slower pace than 
dictated by the US “New Economy” model may provide opportunities for Asian firms to learn from the 
mistakes committed by the early users of these systems (Strassman, 2001; Ciborra et al, 2000; 
Hagstrøm, 2000). 
5.5.  From Poverty Alleviation Strategies to ICT-Enabled Industrial Upgrading Strategies 
Finally, everybody agrees that the most serious challenge for “ICT for Development” strategies in 
the region is to find ways that would enable poor countries and regions to move from poverty alleviation 
strategies to ICT-enabled industrial upgrading strategies. Sadly, very little is known about the drivers, 
realistic options and possible impacts of such transition strategies. While there are plenty of normative 
statements (e.g., Mansell and When, 1998), and long laundry list of micro-projects (‘e.g., appendices in 
UNDP, 2001) we lack relevant data that could guide policy implementation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
argues that much of the earlier productivity boom was simply a reflection of the stock market boom, which was 
based on excessive optimism about the effects of ICT (quoted in: Luce and Kehoe, 2001). 
  28 One of the best studies in this field (Heeks, 1999), exploring the scope for ICT in small and micro-
enterprises, documents serious inequalities, in terms of finance, skills and knowledge, that constrain the 
use of ICT-based information by poor entrepreneurs. The study argues that “ICTs currently have a far 
greater enabling value in building capacity within intermediary institutions - in “helping the helpers” - than 
in directly affecting the poor” (ibid: p.18)
34 Most of these very partial strategies, that are currently 
subsumed under the label of “poverty alleviation”, unfortunately fail to address the real issue of enhancing 
long-term economic growth and welfare in Asia´s poorest societies. History tells us that no country ever 
got rich through poverty alleviation (e.g., Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986; Braudel, 1992). History also 
demonstrates that development is a chain of disequilibria (Schumpeter, 1961; Hirschman, 1958) where 
certain activities and sectors move ahead, at least temporarily, while others decline, uprooting whole 
regions and social classes. 
This clearly indicates that searching for specific ICT applications to alleviate poverty is important 
in the vast poor and rural areas of developing Asia. However, such partial strategies need to be gradually 
transformed into broader, increasingly integrated strategies that also emphasize the development of local 
intangible assets, like skills, finance, and knowledge-intensive support services (KISS). Of equal 
importance over time are complementary capabilities required for the production and design of ICT 
hardware and software. We need to move beyond a too narrow version of “poverty alleviation” that tends 
to see ICT production and design “as too far removed from the lives of the poor to warrant donor agency 
attention” (Heeks, 2000, p.2).  
                                                          
Table 9 Recommendations for Funding Priorities 
Table 9 summarizes our recommendations for funding priorities that could facilitate a transition 
from poverty alleviation to ICT-enabled industrial upgrading. we highlight five key components of an 
integrated strategy of “ICT for development”. First, to reap the benefits of participation in global 
production networks, established by major global electronics corporations ( Ernst, 2001d and 2001f), it is 
necessary to promote local supplier development programs, like the ones developed in Singapore and 
Malaysia. Equally important are co-funding schemes of Skill Development Programs, where seed money 
 
34 Specifically, ICT have enabled NGOs to share experiences about - and thereby improve - their microcredit 
programs and have assisted those campaigning for greater democracy, social equality and protection of the 
  29 from international development agencies would be complemented by funds from global corporations, and 
local companies, induced to do so by tax incentives. An equally important part of the first component are 
schemes to develop standards & ISO qualifications, and the capacity to register patents and trademarks. 
A second priority for funding is infrastructure development. It is important to emphasize that there 
is little need for funding of hardware investments.  This reflects the current market situation, where global 
equipment vendors of telecommunications and networking equipment are eager to expand sales in Asia 
at almost any cost, and where the bargaining power has shifted from sellers to buyers. Financial support 
however is required for the development of a vast array of knowledge-intensive support services that 
encompass web design, outsourcing and application service providers (ASP). 
Market development, both within individual countries and across the region, is a third element of 
an integrated strategy that qualifies as a funding priority. Examples include training schemes for potential 
sophisticated users , like banks and other financial institutions, and local suppliers. Especially in poorer 
countries, priority should first be given to micro-finance schemes for weaker/backward users, as 
described in Heeks, 1999. Fourth, effective reforms of educational and training systems require 
substantial funding. A key criterion for dispersal of funds should be an emphasis on strengthening the 
exposure of local agents  to international linkages and procedures, including informal international 
knowledge communities (Ernst, 2001f). Last but not least, a fifth element of an integrated strategy 
involves the creation of robust sources of investment and innovation finance. It has become standard to 
propose a replication of US-style venture capital. Reflecting the vast differences in economic institutions, 
that approach however has produced only minor results. This raises a number of issues that need to be 
addressed by policy-oriented research. For instance, there is now evidence that corporate stock and 
venture capital have become critical sources of innovation finance worldwide. What changes does this 
require in Asian financial systems that were traditionally focused on directed credit? And how could 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
environment (World bank, 1998). There are also individual examples of ICT assisting government agencies, 
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  38 Table 1.  Specialization-Upgrading Matrix 
 
Variables Complexity/Uncertainty 
  Low High 
Product Specialization  Homogeneous (commodities) 
• Mature technology 
• Established design 
• Easy to replicate 
• Predictable changes in demand 
& technology 
• Limited interactions  w/customers 
Differentiated 
• New technology 
• Fluid design 
• Difficult to replicate 
• Unpredictable changes 
• Close interaction with 
customers 
Process Specialization  Mass Production 
• Economies of scale & scope 
Flexible Specialization 
•Speed of response 
Market Structure  •Low entry barriers 
• Price competition 
• Limited value generation: 
periodic over-capacity & price 
wars ⇒⇒ deflationary pricing 
pressures 
• High entry barriers 
• Premium pricing 
• Significant value generation 
 
Upgrading  • Limited technological learning     
requirements 
• Limited pressure to develop 
forward & backward linkages 
• Substantial pressure to 
broaden & deepen local 
knowledge base 
• Ditto for linkages 
 
 
Table 2.  Developing Asia's Electronics Exports Growth 
 
  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Korea  5.8 6.7  23.7  35.5  -3.3  6.5  -6.7 
Taiwan  10.3 10.9 15.4  32.4  8.5  10.5  1.4 
Singapore  16.9 25.1 45.0  26.2  5.6  0.0  -10.9 
Malaysia  24.4 30.4 37.8  31.2  5.7  2.6  -4.1 
Thailand  25.7 16.1 40.3  29.3 12.6  8.9   
Philippines         29.2  31.7 
China   21.5  49.6 36.0  9.1 23.6  13.6 
 
Source: UN Trade Data Base Comtrade  
 
 
Table 3 Impact of Trade Recession 
 
Table 3a: Korea 
 




    +19  +20  -14 (June, yoy) 
-17 (July, yoy) 
SC exports 




=5.7% of GDP 










(1. half, total 
electronics 
exports) 
Computers     > 6 times    -19 (1. half) 
Export dependence 
(exports/GDP,%) 
25     40   






Table 3b. Taiwan 
 
Growth of merchandise exports (yoy,%)  -17 (June 2001) 
> - 20 (projection for 3.q.  2001) 
Output growth of electronics industry (yoy, %)  > - 15 (projection for 2001) 
Share of electronics exports to US in Taiwan´s 
total electronics exports (%) 
40 
Exports of Hsinchu Science Park/ total exports of 




Table 3c. Southeast Asia 
 
Decline of June 2001 merchandise exports, 
yoy,% 
Malaysia:     -14 
Indonesia:   -10 
Malaysia (%)  •  Electronics exports, growth (2.q, yoy): -18.4 
•  Electronics production, growth (2.q, yoy): -25.2 
•  Electronics exports/total exports: 59 
•  Exports to the US/GDP: 24 
Singapore (%)  •  Electronics exports, growth (2.q, yoy): >-20  
•  Electronics exports/total exports: 64 





Table 3d. China 
 
Growth of electronics exports, July 2001 (yoy, 
%) 
-8 
Electronics exports/total exports (%)  30 
 Table 4. Asian Trade Specialization Profiles: RCA and Leading Export Products 
 
Country      Product              RCA              Share in Electronics exports (%) 
 
   '93  '94  '95  '96  '97  '98  '93  '94  '95  '96  '97  '98 
Korea  Computers  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.7 14.4  11.9 12.2 14.5 15.5 13.9 
 o/w  storage  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.7  1.3 1.1 0.5  0.8 1.0 1.8 4.1 4.1 
 Components 2.4  2.7  2.8  2.7  2.8  2.7 50.1  56.2 62.4 60.8 62.3 63.4 
 o/w  semiconductors  3.3  3.8  4.1  3.6  4.0  3.8 30.4  37.2 45.7 40.3 42.9 45.3 
 Consumer  electronics  2.3  2.4  2.0  2.0  1.7  1.5 22.5  20.5 16.1 15.6 12.8 12.7 
 Telecommunications  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.6 0.5 3.0  2.7 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.9 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
28.0  29.7  30.9  28.8  29.2  28.3         
Taiwan  Computers  2.5 2.7 3.0 3.4      39.4  39.0  41.6  45.0  44.62  45.29 
 o/w  storage  0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6      0.8 0.6  1.0  1.3  2.10  1.97 
 Components 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2      37.2  39.3  41.6  40.2  41.93  40.86 
 o/w  semiconductors  1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2      13.7  16.8  20.4  19.6  22.05  21.77 
 Consumer  electronics  1.4 1.5 1.2 1.1      12.9  12.0  8.5  6.8  6.42  5.98 
 Telecommunications  1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6      4.9 4.8  4.1  4.0  3.59  4.20 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
29.5  31.0  34.3  35.8            
Singapore  Computers  4.6  5.1  5.1  5.4  5.5  5.2 40.7  38.6 39.4 42.8 44.1 44.6 
 o/w  storage 12.9  13.4  12.8  15.3  12.4 11.4 17.6  15.7 16.0 18.8 19.3 19.8 
 Components 2.7  3.4  3.4  3.6  3.7  3.7 29.4  35.4 38.5 38.0 38.9 40.7 
 o/w  semiconductors  3.2  4.0  4.2  4.5  4.8  5.0 15.7  19.4 23.8 23.9 25.0 27.4 
 Consumer  electronics  3.1 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.3  1.7  15.9  13.7  11.6  10.4  8.7  6.8 
 Telecommunications  1.1  1.2  1.1  0.8  0.7 0.6 1.9  1.9 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.1 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
53.0  58.8  60.7  60.7  60.6  61.4         
Malaysia  Computers  1.4  1.8  2.0  2.3  2.9  3.0 13.8  15.6 17.1 20.5 25.3 27.4 
 o/w  storage  0.0  0.1  0.8  0.2  3.7 4.1 0.0  0.2 1.1 0.3 6.3 7.6 
 Components 3.7  3.7  3.6  3.8  3.9  3.9 44.6  42.6 43.9 44.6 45.1 45.7 
 o/w  semiconductors  5.6  5.2  4.7  4.9  5.3  5.2 30.5  28.3 29.8 29.3 30.1 30.7 
 Consumer  electronics  4.2  5.0  5.1  5.0  4.1  3.5 24.2  24.2 22.6 20.1 16.5 15.1 
 Telecommunications  2.1  2.4  2.0  2.0  1.7 1.5 3.8  4.0 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.8 
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
47.6  52.5  54.9  54.7  55.8  57.5         
Thailand  Computers  1.4  1.8  1.9  2.4  2.5    32.2  34.0 36.8 41.4 40.9   
 o/w  storage  2.8 5.4 4.6 4.5 2.0    9.8  15.5  14.0  11.9  6.2   
 Components 1.4  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6    38.4  38.8 39.9 36.5 35.8   
 o/w  semiconductors  1.7  1.6  1.4  1.6  1.7    20.8  19.3 19.5 18.8 18.3   
 Consumer  electronics  1.3  1.6  1.4  1.5  1.7    16.7  16.4 13.3 12.0 13.1   
 Telecommunications  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.2    5.2  3.9 3.7 4.1 3.9   
 Memo:                    
  Share of Electronics 
in Merchandise 
exports (%) 
20.8  24.0  24.9  28.4  29.6          
Source:   UN Trade Data Base Comtrade Table 5.  Dependence on Input Imports 
 
 In Electronics Imports (%)         In Merchandise Imports (%) 
  
                           
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Korea Components 57.0 53.2 54.1 55.3 60.2 71.6 9.5 9.5 9.7 10.0 12.0 16.6
                            o/w
Semiconductors 
34.8 34.0 35.7 36.8 43.0 54.7 5.8 6.0 6.4 6.7 8.6 12.7
Taiwan                      Components  66.3 67.5 70.0 65.3  13.7 14.8 16.9 16.7 
                        o/w
Semiconductors 
41.2 43.9 46.5 43.1  8.5 9.7 11.2 11.0 
Singapore                          Components  48.0 52.9 56.9 55.4 53.4 56.4 18.6 23.2 26.0 24.3 23.8 26.5
                            o/w
Semiconductors 
25.0 30.5 35.6 33.9 33.6 37.3 9.7 13.4 16.2 14.9 15.0 17.5
Malaysia                          Components  76.5 78.7 78.1 76.7 72.8 78.5 25.3 28.3 28.8 29.6 28.3 36.7
                            o/w
Semiconductors 
42.9 45.9 49.7 49.6 49.2 56.5 14.2 16.5 18.3 19.1 19.1 26.4
Thailand                      Components  55.1 55.9 59.1 60.0 58.7  9.6 11.6 12.4 12.6 14.1 
                        o/w
Semiconductors 
26.4 26.8 28.7 30.2 29.9  4.6 5.6 6.0 6.4 7.2 
Philippines                      Components  37.8 40.3 43.7 54.7 34.9  5.8 6.6 7.7 20.7 9.4 
                        o/w
Semiconductors 
28.0 28.8 30.3 46.6 27.0  4.3 4.7 5.4 17.7 7.3 
Indonesia                          Components  46.4 48.6 46.3 37.5 33.8 33.9 4.4 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.0
                            o/w
Semiconductors 
4.5 4.0 3.8 2.9 2.1 2.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Hong  Kong                          Components  38.0 38.1 39.7 39.6 40.5 40.1 9.8 10.4 11.6 11.6 12.5 12.8
                            o/w
Semiconductors 
18.8 18.7 20.7 20.2 20.3 19.6 4.8 5.1 6.0 5.9 6.3 6.2
China                          Components  40.9 43.1 44.3 49.6 55.0 53.1 5.3 6.3 6.9 7.4 9.2 11.4
                            o/w
Semiconductors 
11.0 12.5 14.7 17.7 21.4 22.3 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.6 3.6 4.8
  
Table 6.  Comparison of Internet Users as a Percentage of Total Population 
 
       Total 
Population 
Internet Users  Internet Users 
as % of Total Population 
 
Mainland China  1.3 billion  16.9 million  1.3 
Hong Kong  7    million  1.9 million  27 
Taiwan  22  million  6.4 million  29 
Chinese in the U.S.  3    million  2.1 million  70 
Source: Nua Internet Surveys (July 2000) 
 Table 7.  Digital Divides: Indicators 
I. ICT readiness 
1.  Teledensity (telephone main lines per 1,000) 
2.  Mobile phone density per 1,000 
3.  Internet hosts per 10,000 
4.  PC per 1,000 
5.  Internet users per 1,000 
6.  Internet monthly access charges (US-$) (phone call & ISP charges) 
7.  per capita GDP  
8.  Knowledge (combined first-, second, and third-level gross enrollment ratio) 
9.  Trust (1-piracy rate)  
 
II. E-business readiness 
1.  Secure servers per 1,000 
2.  Size of combined ERP and ASP markets 
3.  Licenses for 2.5G and 3G systems 
4.  Investment in broadband infrastructure  
 
III. Matching Production & Use of ICT 
1.  ICT investment, as % of GDP 
2.  ICT investment in electronics industry, as % of GDP 
3.  ICT investment in non-electronics industries, as % of GDP 
4.  Employment figures, electronics industry 
5.  Aggregated ICT employment 
6.  Investment and R&D in electronics industry 
 
  Table 8. New Economy: Unfulfilled Promises 
 
Claims Reality 
The traditional business cycle is dead  •  America's GDP growth falls from 5% in 
2000 to 0.7% or lower 
•  "Nobody understands what is going on" 
•  "I have never seen anything like this 
before" 
More predictable inventory cycles →→ 
Smother business cycle 
•  limited visibility", even for Cisco &Dell 
1.Q 2001: Cisco had $2.2 billion worth of 
surplus inventory of components = equivalent 
to almost 50% of its sales during the period 
•  Nothing can stop rise in profitabilityShare 
prices are delinked from profitability: new 
rules apply for share evaluation 
•  Average profits are projected to fall by at 
least 10% in 2001 
•  Free fall in P/E ratios since the burst of the 
dotcom bubble 
Non-IT industries will continue to invest heavily 
in ICT, even during recession 
No: ICT investments are in free fall, across all 
sectors 
2.Q 2001: ICT investment in U.S. fell > 15% in 
real terms (compared to 2.Q 2000) 
Shift to higher sustainable growth due to faster 
improvements in labor productivity & TFP 
•  Accelerated productivity growth: yes 
(1995-2000: ca 2.0% for labor productivity 
in America's non-business sector) 
•  BUT: Will productivity gains survive global 
recession? 
•  U.S. productivity declines since 1.Q 2001 
•  Fundamental transformations in economic 
structures and institutions  
•  Yes, but this is only new to neo-classical 
economists 
  
Table 9: Recommendations for Funding Priorities 
 
A. Reaping the Benefits of Network Participation 
•  Local supplier development programs 
•  Co-funding of Skill Development Schemes 
•  Standards & ISO qualifications 
 
B. Infrastructure Development 
•  Move beyond hardware bias: development of professional services 
 
C. Market Development (domestic; macro-region) 
•  Training of potential sophisticated users (banks, local suppliers) 
•  Micro-finance for weaker/backward users 
 
D. Reform of Educational & Training Systems 
•  Key: strengthen exposure to international linkages and procedures 
 
E.  Creating Robust Sources of Investment and Innovation Finance 
•  Corporate stock and venture capital have become critical sources of innovation finance 
worldwide.  
•  What changes does this require in Asian financial systems that were traditionally focused 
on directed credit? 
•  How to integrate micro-finance systems? 
 








Attempts to copy the 
"new economy" model 
(Malaysia, China, Korea) 
Poverty 
alleviation 
Export-led clusters for 
"commodities" 
From domestic market & 
capability development 
to export orientation 
Small open economies 
(Korea,Taiwan,Malaysia, 
Thailand,,Costa Rica,Ireland)  (Brazil, India, Israel, 
China) 





•  Reducing mismatch between production and use 
•  Developing design capabilities & knowledge-intensive services 
•  Linking ICT investments to development of local capabilities & markets 